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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
In 2015, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Daniel 
Golden and publicist Tracy Locke were conducting research 
for Golden’s then-forthcoming book, Spy Schools:  How the 
CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s 
Universities.1  As part of that research, Golden and Locke 
invoked open records laws to request documents from public 
universities.  From April to August of 2015, Golden and Locke 
submitted three records requests to the New Jersey Institute of 
Technology (“NJIT”) under New Jersey’s Open Public 
Records Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1A-1–47:1A-13 (“OPRA”).  
Many of NJIT’s documents that were responsive to the OPRA 
requests originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI” or “the Bureau”) and were subject to prohibitions on 
public dissemination.  NJIT’s custodian of records, Clara 
Williams, therefore asked the FBI to advise NJIT as to whether 
it should allow access to the records.  In no uncertain terms, the 
FBI directed NJIT to withhold most of the records.  NJIT 
obliged, claiming that the documents were exempt from 
disclosure.  This lawsuit followed. 
After removal of this case to federal court, NJIT and the 
FBI agreed to reexamine the previously withheld records.  As 
a result of that review, NJIT produced thousands of pages of 
documents it had formerly deemed exempt.  Golden and Locke 
then moved for attorneys’ fees under OPRA, which mandates 
                                                 
1 Golden’s book was published by Henry Holt and Co. 
in October 2017.  At the time of the events in this case, Locke 
was a publicist with Henry Holt and Co. 
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a fee award for prevailing plaintiffs.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 47:1A-6.  The District Court denied the fee motion, holding 
that no nexus existed between the lawsuit filed by Golden and 
Locke and the eventual release of records.  The Court was 
persuaded by NJIT’s position that it had acted reasonably in 
following the FBI’s direction. 
We disagree with both the District Court’s conclusion 
and its misplaced focus on reasonableness.  Under the catalyst 
theory, as adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees if there exists “a factual 
causal nexus between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately 
achieved” and if “the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had 
a basis in law.”  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017, 
1032 (N.J. 2008) (quoting Singer v. State, 472 A.2d 138, 142 
(N.J. 1984)).  Before Golden and Locke filed suit, NJIT had 
asserted OPRA exemptions to justify withholding the majority 
of the requested records.  Post-lawsuit, NJIT abandoned its 
reliance on those exemptions and produced most of the 
records.  Golden and Locke’s lawsuit was the catalyst for the 
production of documents and thereby satisfied the Mason test.  
That NJIT withheld records at the behest of the FBI does not 
afford it a basis to abdicate its role as the records custodian.  
NJIT alone bore the burden of allowing or denying access to 
the requested records.  With that burden comes the attendant 
responsibility of paying attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff.  
We will therefore reverse and remand for the calculation of 
attorneys’ fees. 
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I. 
A. 
Enacted in 2002, the purpose of OPRA is “to maximize 
public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an 
informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a 
secluded process.”  Id. at 1025 (quoting Asbury Park Press v. 
Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 864 A.2d 446, 458 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004)).  To effectuate that purpose, OPRA 
outlines a procedure to ensure that “government records shall 
be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination 
by the citizens of [New Jersey.]”2  Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 47:1A-1).  And OPRA requires every “[p]ublic agency,” 
including NJIT, to designate a records custodian.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 47:1A-1.1.  A records custodian is, as relevant here, 
“the officer officially designated by formal action of [the] 
agency’s director or governing body.”  Id. 
A person seeking government records must submit to 
the records custodian a written request for access that is “hand-
delivered, mailed, transmitted electronically, or otherwise 
                                                 
2 A “[g]overnment record” is broadly defined as “any 
paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, 
photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed 
document, information stored or maintained electronically or 
by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1.1.  “Government record” includes 
both records that an agency “made, maintained or kept on file 
in the course of . . .  its official business,” and those that have 
“been received in the course of . . . official business.”  Id. 
 6 
 
conveyed.”  Id. § 47:1A-5(g).  Once that request is made, the 
custodian “shall permit the record to be inspected, examined, 
and copied by any person during regular business hours” unless 
the record is exempt from access.3  Id. § 47:1A-5(a).  The 
agency may charge a nominal fee for the cost of duplicating 
records, id. § 47:1A-5(b)(1), as well as a special service charge 
for requests that “involv[e] an extraordinary expenditure of 
time and effort,”  id. § 47:1A-5(c). 
Absent any applicable exemptions,4 the records 
custodian must generally disclose government records no later 
                                                 
3 The hours during which the records custodian must 
make records available are abbreviated for smaller public 
agencies.  See id. § 47:1A-5(a). 
4 Under OPRA, exemptions may be contained within 
OPRA itself, and also incorporated in resolutions of the New 
Jersey Legislature, Executive Orders, federal laws or 
regulations, or federal orders.  Id. § 47:1A-5(a).  Exemptions 
are construed narrowly.  See id. § 47:1A-1 (declaring it to be 
the public policy of New Jersey that any limitations on the right 
of access accorded by OPRA “shall be construed in favor of 
the public’s right of access”). 
If the records custodian deems part of a record to be 
exempt, she must delete or redact that portion and permit 
access to the remainder of the record.  Id. § 47:1A-5(g).  Before 
turning over responsive records, the records custodian also 
redacts certain personal information, including social security 
numbers, credit card numbers, and drivers’ license numbers.  
Id. § 47:1A-5(a). 
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than seven business days after receiving the request.5  Id. 
§ 47:1A-5(i).  If the custodian cannot comply with the request, 
she must “indicate the specific basis therefor on the request 
form and promptly return it to the requestor.”  Id. § 47:1A-5(g).  
In the event a request for access “would substantially disrupt 
agency operations,” the custodian must “attempt[] to reach a 
reasonable solution with the requestor that accommodates the 
interests of the requestor and the agency” before denying 
access.  Id.  If the custodian fails to respond to a request within 
seven business days, she is deemed to have denied the request.  
Id. § 47:1A-5(i). 
If the records custodian denies access to a government 
record, the requestor has two options:  file a lawsuit in the New 
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, or a complaint with the 
Government Records Council.  Id. § 47:1A-6.  Either action 
“shall proceed in a summary or expedited manner,” with the 
public agency bearing “the burden of proving that the denial of 
access is authorized by law.”  Id. 
“OPRA provides for attorney’s fees and civil penalties 
in certain circumstances.”  Mason, 951 A.2d at 1026.  “A 
requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-6.  
Moreover, if a records custodian “knowingly and willfully 
                                                 
5 Certain records, including budgets, bills, vouchers, 
and contracts, are required to be provided immediately upon 
request.  Id. § 47:1A-5(e).  If a record is in storage or archived, 
the custodian must so notify the requestor within seven days 
and arrange to retrieve the record promptly.  Id. §§ 47:1A-5(g), 
(i). 
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violates [OPRA] . . . and is found to have unreasonably denied 
access under the totality of the circumstances,” she is subject 
to a range of civil penalties, as well as appropriate disciplinary 
action.  Id. § 47:1A-11(a). 
B. 
In 2015, Golden and Locke were conducting research 
for a book Golden was writing that would examine foreign and 
domestic intelligence activities at United States universities.  
On April 8, 2015, Golden submitted the first OPRA request to 
Williams, NJIT’s records custodian.  The first request sought 
(1) “all e-mail communications since January 
1, 2010, between the Central Intelligence 
Agency or its representatives using the 
email domains @ucia.gov, @cia.gov, or 
any other address, and the following 
people at the New Jersey Institute of 
Technology:  the president, chancellor(s), 
provost(s), vice provost(s), vice 
presidents, deans, general counsel, 
assistant general counsel, outside counsel, 
and campus police chief”; and 
(2)  “all e-mail communications since 
January 1, 2010, between the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation or its 
representatives using the email domains 
@ic.fbi.gov, @fbi.gov, or any other email 
address, and the same people at NJIT.” 
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App. 58.  NJIT staff accessed the computer system to search 
for the email extensions contained in Golden’s request.  NJIT 
located over 1,400 emails, which Williams began to review and 
print.  Due to the volume of emails, Williams asked for and 
received from Golden an extension of the seven-day OPRA 
deadline to turn over records covered by the request. 
During Williams’s review, she discovered that many of 
the emails—which were mostly from the FBI to NJIT—
contained dissemination controls.6  For example, some emails 
warned, “do not disclose,” or “proprietary and confidential 
information.”  App. 213, ¶ 27.  Williams believed that these 
emails likely fell within OPRA’s exemption for third-party 
confidential information, and she notified the FBI of the first 
request and the responsive emails.  In turn, the FBI told 
Williams that it would need to review all of the emails before 
she disclosed them to Golden. 
In May 2015, FBI agents visited NJIT to review the 
emails Williams had compiled.  The FBI advised Williams 
“that any emails directed to and received from the FBI are 
deemed FBI records and, as such, are the property of the United 
States Government.”  App. 214, ¶ 31.  The FBI also told 
Williams that it, not NJIT, “is cloaked with full and exclusive 
authority to determine whether or not any such email is subject 
to disclosure.”  App. 214, ¶ 31.  The FBI redacted some emails 
and marked others as classified.  The FBI instructed Williams 
to produce certain records and to withhold others. 
                                                 
6 NJIT’s search failed to turn up any responsive records 
relating to the CIA. 
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On May 29, 2015, Williams responded to Golden’s first 
request.  NJIT produced approximately 540 pages of records, 
many of which were redacted.  NJIT also withheld 3,949 pages, 
citing several OPRA exemptions.  See App. 61–62 (citing, 
inter alia, exemptions for domestic security and documents 
that would be exempt under federal law, including the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)).  Williams’s response 
included a letter from the FBI memorializing its directive to 
withhold the records. 
Approximately two months later, on July 28, 2015, 
Locke submitted to NJIT a second OPRA request, which was 
identical to the first request.  The following day, Williams 
contacted the FBI to advise it of the second request and to 
confirm her understanding that NJIT was prohibited from 
releasing any additional records.  Williams then denied 
Locke’s request; citing many of the same OPRA exemptions 
as before, Williams advised that NJIT would not produce any 
additional records and enclosed the FBI’s May 2015 letter 
prohibiting disclosure. 
Just a few weeks later, on August 13, 2015, Golden 
submitted a third OPRA request.  The third request mirrored 
the first and second requests.  Noticing this duplication, 
Williams asked Golden if he had submitted the request in error; 
he responded that the third request was broader than the first 
two because it sought records through the date of the most 
recent request.  After again consulting with the FBI, Williams 
denied the third request pursuant to the same OPRA 
exemptions and enclosed the FBI’s May 2015 letter. 
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C. 
Roughly a month later, in September 2015, Golden and 
Locke sued NJIT and Williams under OPRA and New Jersey’s 
common law right of access in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey Law Division, Essex County.7  The Court issued a show 
cause order to NJIT.8  Although the FBI initially told NJIT it 
would intervene in the lawsuit, the Bureau opted not to do so.  
As a result, NJIT filed a third-party complaint against the FBI 
for indemnification in the event the Court awarded Golden and 
Locke attorneys’ fees. 
In December 2015, the FBI removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  The FBI counterclaimed 
against NJIT, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent NJIT from releasing responsive records to Golden and 
Locke.  The Court stayed all discovery in the case pending a 
status conference. 
Beginning in January 2016, the Magistrate Judge to 
whom the case was referred held a series of status conferences 
with the parties.  As of February 2016, NJIT and the FBI 
                                                 
7 Golden’s common law right of access claim is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
8 In early December 2015, following oral argument on 
the order to show cause, Judge Stephanie A. Mitterhoff ruled 
that the case was not yet ready for adjudication because the FBI 
needed additional time to review documents.  Judge Mitterhoff 
ordered the FBI to start reviewing documents immediately. 
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possessed approximately 6,000 pages of undisclosed 
documents responsive to the OPRA requests.  Of the 6,000 
pages, the Bureau claimed that 4,000 were federal records that 
were purportedly exempt from disclosure under OPRA.  The 
FBI agreed to treat the remaining 2,000 pages as a request from 
NJIT to consult, and the Bureau would review the documents 
at a rate of 500 pages per month.  Although Golden and Locke 
did not agree with the FBI’s position as to the 4,000 
purportedly exempt pages, all parties agreed to the consultation 
procedure.  Given the progress, the Magistrate Judge stayed the 
case. 
In June 2016, the FBI reported that it had reviewed 
approximately 2,000 pages of responsive records.  The FBI 
redacted and returned the documents to NJIT, “which in turn 
produced the redacted documents to Plaintiffs in accordance 
with FBI protocols for consultation requests.”  App. 143.  The 
FBI also undertook “a further cursory review” of the remaining 
purportedly exempt pages and agreed to review them at a rate 
of 500 pages per month.  App. 143. 
In October 2016, the FBI finished its review of the 6,000 
pages.  NJIT produced 3,445 unredacted pages and 379 
partially redacted pages.9  NJIT withheld 26 pages pursuant to 
a FOIA exemption and 1,614 pages because the FBI asserted 
control over those documents.  The Bureau agreed to provide 
Golden and Locke with additional information concerning the 
withheld documents in an effort to narrow the issues for 
judicial review. 
                                                 
9 Approximately 362 pages were duplicates. 
 13 
 
In January 2017, the parties reported that they had 
“made substantial progress in narrowing the issues to be 
litigated.”  App. 151.  Golden and Locke agreed not to 
challenge a substantial number of the withheld documents.  
They also provided NJIT and the FBI with a list of specific 
withheld documents that they wanted the Bureau to revisit.  In 
February 2017, the FBI produced additional records.  In light 
of upcoming publication deadlines for Golden’s book, he and 
Locke opted not to challenge the remainder of the withheld 
documents.  The parties advised the Magistrate Judge that the 
only issue that remained to be resolved was Golden and 
Locke’s forthcoming motion for attorneys’ fees as prevailing 
parties under OPRA. 
Golden and Locke filed a motion for attorneys’ fees in 
November 2017, seeking $197,829.50.  NJIT opposed the 
motion.  In April 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report 
and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the 
District Court deny the fee motion.  The Magistrate Judge 
believed that no causal nexus existed between Golden and 
Locke’s lawsuit and the production of records.  The Magistrate 
Judge reasoned that because the FBI—not NJIT—asserted and 
then abandoned OPRA exemptions, NJIT’s conduct was 
“unaffected and unchanged” by the filing of the lawsuit.  App. 
23.  The Magistrate Judge also ruled that NJIT’s conduct was 
reasonable.  Golden and Locke objected to the R&R. 
On August 2, 2018, the District Court adopted the R&R 
and denied Golden and Locke’s fee motion.  Like the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Court considered NJIT’s 
conduct to be “reasonable in light of the FBI’s repeated 
demand that NJIT not release records without its approval, 
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NJIT’s consistent position to Plaintiffs that it would not do so, 
and its attempts to facilitate a resolution for Plaintiffs.”  App. 
7.  The District Court also agreed with the Magistrate Judge 
that, while the FBI’s conduct had changed because of the 
lawsuit, NJIT had not altered its position. 
Golden and Locke timely appealed. 
II. 
Neither of the parties questioned the District Court’s 
jurisdiction, nor did the Court raise the issue sua sponte.  We, 
however, must fulfill our “independent obligation” to ensure 
that jurisdiction exists.10  N.J. Carpenters and Trs. Thereof v. 
Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The FBI removed 
this case under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1442(a)(1).  The “central aim” of the federal officer removal 
statute “is [to] protect[] officers of the federal government from 
interference by litigation in state court while those officers are 
trying to carry out their duties.”  Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., 
Inc., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016).  To achieve that end, 
“the federal officer removal statute is to be broadly construed 
in favor of a federal forum.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Four requirements must be satisfied before a district 
court may assert jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1):  (1) “the 
                                                 
10 “We review de novo whether the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction.”  In re Commonwealth’s Motion to 
Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 
790 F.3d 457, 465 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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defendant is a person within the meaning of the statute”; (2) 
“the plaintiff’s claims are based upon the defendant’s conduct 
acting under the United States, its agencies, or its officers”; (3) 
“the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant are for, or relating 
to an act under color of federal office”; and (4) “the defendant 
raises a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff’s claims.”  Id. 
at 812 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The FBI’s notice of removal cites only the applicable 
statute, § 1442(a)(1), and concludes that the action is 
removable “because it involves a civil action against the FBI—
an agency of the United States.”  Notice of Removal at 3, ¶ 8, 
Golden v. N.J. Inst. of Tech., No. 2:15-cv-08559 (D.N.J. Dec. 
11, 2015), ECF No. 1.  Although the notice of removal is 
facially inadequate,11 we conclude after independently 
reviewing the record that the four requirements for jurisdiction 
are easily satisfied here. 
The FBI is a federal agency, which fulfills the first 
requirement.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (permitting “[t]he 
United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any 
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any 
agency thereof” to remove a case under § 1442(a)(1)). 
The second requirement, that NJIT’s claims be based 
upon the FBI’s “conduct acting under the United States, its 
agencies, or its officers,” is “liberally construed to cover 
actions that involve an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the 
                                                 
11 See id. at 466 (instructing that the notice of removal 
“must allege the underlying facts supporting each of the 
requirements for removal jurisdiction”). 
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federal supervisor’s duties or tasks.”  Papp, 842 F.3d at 812 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
requirement is also easily met here.  For example, the FBI 
alleges that it directed NJIT to withhold certain records that 
“contain critical intelligence to detect and prevent violent 
crime and terrorism in the United States before such acts 
occur.”  App. 132, ¶ 60.  Clearly, the FBI’s conduct—directing 
NJIT to withhold such records—was “assisting,” or helping to 
effectuate, “the duties or tasks” of the United States, to wit, 
protecting citizens from crime and terrorism.  In re 
Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or 
Directed to Def. Ass’n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The FBI was thus 
“acting under” the United States. 
The third requirement is that “the plaintiff’s claims 
against the defendant [be] for, or relating to an act under color 
of federal office.”  Papp, 842 F.3d at 812 (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  To meet this requirement, 
“it is sufficient for there to be a ‘connection’ or ‘association’ 
between the act in question and the federal office.”  Def. Ass’n, 
790 F.3d at 471.  Here, the FBI asserted that certain of NJIT’s 
documents were property of the United States and demanded 
that NJIT withhold those documents to protect the United 
States’ confidentiality interests.  See App. 100, ¶ 8 (third-party 
complaint, alleging that the FBI sought withholding of certain 
records because “the information is law enforcement sensitive 
and may implicate criminal and/or national security interests”).  
The FBI has thereby set forth a “connection or association” 
between the Bureau’s actions and the United States, and the 
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acts at issue thus satisfy the “under color of federal office” 
requirement. 
Finally, jurisdiction can exist under § 1442(a)(1) only if 
“the defendant raises a colorable federal defense to the 
plaintiff’s claims.”  Papp, 842 F.3d at 812 (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  For purposes of federal 
officer removal jurisdiction, a defense is “colorable” if it is 
“legitimate and [can] reasonably be asserted, given the facts 
presented and the current law.”  Id. at 815; see also Jefferson 
Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (rejecting “a narrow, 
grudging interpretation” of § 1442(a)’s colorable federal 
defense requirement).  The FBI raises several defenses to 
NJIT’s claims, but it is sufficient for our purposes to focus on 
just one—that the disputed records are “federal records” not 
subject to OPRA.12 
The FBI alleges that the disputed records are federal 
records within the meaning of 44 U.S.C. § 3301 and that, as 
such, these records are not subject to OPRA and cannot be 
disclosed to Golden and Locke under that statute.  In other 
words, the FBI argues that its status as a federal agency and the 
resulting status of the records as federal records precludes 
enforcement of state law.  This defense is similar to other 
colorable federal defenses centering on potential state 
interference with a federal agency.  See, e.g., Def. Ass’n, 790 
                                                 
12 The FBI also raises two other potential federal 
defenses—that portions of the disputed records are exempt 
from disclosure under the Privacy Act of 1974 and FOIA.  We 
need not decide whether these defenses qualify as colorable 
federal defenses under § 1442(a)(1). 
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F.3d at 474 (explaining that the defendant had raised a 
colorable federal defense by claiming that the Commonwealth 
was preempted, under Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347–48 (2001), from interfering in 
the defendant’s relationship with a federal agency); see also 
Acker, 527 U.S. at 431 (holding that the defendants had raised 
a colorable federal defense by alleging that a state tax 
interfered with the operation of the federal judiciary, in 
violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine).  We 
need not, and do not, pass on the merits of the FBI’s defense.  
For jurisdictional purposes, it is sufficient that the FBI has 
raised a colorable federal defense under § 1442(a)(1).  See 
Papp, 842 F.3d at 815 (“A defendant need not win his case 
before he can have it removed.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  We are satisfied that the four prerequisites for 
§ 1442(a)(1) jurisdiction are met.13 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1367, and we exercise jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                 
13 The FBI’s status as a third-party defendant does not 
affect our conclusion that jurisdiction exists; third-party 
defendants may remove under § 1442(a)(1).  See, e.g., Johnson 
v. Showers, 747 F.2d 1228, 1229 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The fact that 
the Director is a third-party defendant does not defeat removal 
under section 1442(a)(1).”); IMFC Prof’l Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. 
Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(same). 
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III. 
On appeal, Golden and Locke argue that, as prevailing 
plaintiffs, they are entitled to a mandatory award of attorneys’ 
fees under OPRA.14  As they see it, the calculus is simple:  pre-
suit, NJIT withheld thousands of pages of records pursuant to 
OPRA exemptions, only to abandon its resort to those 
exemptions by releasing the records after the lawsuit was filed.  
As NJIT would have it, the analysis is not quite so 
straightforward because the FBI was directing NJIT to 
withhold the records.  That directive, NJIT contends, renders 
its actions reasonable and permissible under OPRA. 
A. 
Under OPRA, “[a] requestor who prevails in any 
proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-6; see Teeters v. Div. of Youth & 
Family Servs., 904 A.2d 747, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006) (describing OPRA’s “shall be entitled” language as 
“mandatory”).  A requestor is a so-called “prevailing party if 
he or she achieves the desired result because the complaint 
brought about change (voluntary or otherwise) in the 
custodian’s conduct.”  Spectraserv, Inc. v. Middlesex Cty. 
Utils. Auth., 7 A.3d 231, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
                                                 
14 We exercise plenary review over whether a party is a 
“prevailing party” under OPRA for purposes of attorneys’ fee 
awards.  See Addie v. Kjaer, 836 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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An OPRA requestor need not secure a judicial order 
compelling the release of records to be entitled to attorneys’ 
fees.  Rather, under the catalyst theory adopted by New Jersey 
courts, “prevailing plaintiffs” may attain attorneys’ fees when, 
like Golden and Locke, they obtain records “when a 
government agency voluntarily discloses [them] after a lawsuit 
is filed.”  Mason, 951 A.2d at 1021.  Such plaintiffs are entitled 
to fees if they can demonstrate (1) “a factual causal nexus 
between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately 
achieved”; and (2) that “the relief ultimately secured by 
plaintiffs had a basis in law.”15  Id. at 1032.  This assessment 
is fact-sensitive and evaluates “the reasonableness of, and 
motivations for, an agency’s decisions.”  Id. at 1033.  The 
dispute in this case centers on the first prong—whether there 
exists a factual causal nexus between Golden and Locke’s 
lawsuit and the release of the disputed records, as both parties 
have conceded the second prong is met. 
Golden and Locke have proven a factual causal nexus 
between their lawsuit and the release of records.  Before the 
lawsuit, NJIT refused to release the majority of documents 
responsive to the first OPRA request and completely denied 
the second and third requests.  After Golden and Locke filed 
suit, NJIT agreed to the FBI’s consultation procedure and 
subsequently released 3,445 unredacted pages and 379 
partially redacted pages.  By releasing these previously 
                                                 
15 Although, as in this case, the requestor generally 
bears the burden of establishing the Mason factors, the burden 
shifts to the agency if it fails to respond to an OPRA request 
within seven days.  Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017, 
1032 (N.J. 2008). 
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withheld records, NJIT abandoned any reliance on the OPRA 
exemptions it had formerly asserted.  There is no indication in 
the record that NJIT would have produced the previously 
withheld documents absent Golden and Locke’s lawsuit.  On 
the contrary, NJIT allowed access to the records only after a 
lengthy, cooperative process overseen by the Magistrate Judge.  
It is clear, then, that Golden and Locke’s lawsuit was the 
catalyst for the release of records. 
B. 
That NJIT chose to rely upon the FBI’s directives does 
not change our conclusion.  As discussed supra, the catalyst 
theory focuses on whether there exists “a factual causal nexus 
between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately achieved” and 
whether the relief awarded “had a basis in law.”  Mason, 951 
A.2d at 1032 (internal quotation marks omitted).  OPRA makes 
clear that a records custodian—not a third-party—has the duty 
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to decide whether to allow or deny access to records.16  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-5(a), (g).  That duty is accompanied by the 
burden of paying attorneys’ fees if the custodian wrongly 
decides not to disclose records.  See Courier News v. 
Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 876 A.2d 806, 811 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).  To the extent NJIT’s withholding 
was involuntary due to the FBI’s directives, such 
involuntariness is irrelevant to our inquiry under the statute.  
See Spectraserv, Inc., 7 A.3d at 242 (acknowledging that a 
third party’s interest does not supersede the records custodian’s 
obligation to produce non-exempt documents). 
                                                 
16 NJIT argues that the FBI was “the de facto custodian 
of records relative to plaintiffs’ OPRA requests,” Appellees’ 
Br. 28, and that it had physical custody of and “absolute 
responsibility” for the records, id. at 32.  These statements are 
irreconcilable both with the facts of this case and New Jersey 
law.  Williams herself admitted that she is NJIT’s custodian of 
records.  NJIT, acting through Williams, also acted 
consistently with the role of records custodian:  it located the 
records, printed the records, reviewed the records, asked the 
FBI to review the records, provided the FBI with physical 
copies of the records, produced the records after the FBI’s 
review, and asserted OPRA exemptions as to the withheld 
records.  Moreover, OPRA defines a records custodian as an 
“officer officially designated by formal action of [a public] 
agency’s director or governing body”—a definition that does 
not include federal agencies such as the FBI.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 47:1A-1.1; see also id. (defining “[p]ublic agencies” within 
the meaning of OPRA). 
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In Courier News, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
Appellate Division considered a question similar to that 
presented here—whether a records custodian or a third party 
with an interest in the disputed records was liable for attorneys’ 
fees under OPRA.  See 876 A.2d at 807–08.  In a previous 
appeal, the Appellate Division had determined that a tape 
recording of a 911 call in the custody of the Hunterdon County 
Prosecutor’s Office (the “County”) was subject to disclosure 
under OPRA.  Id. at 808–09.  The Appellate Division 
remanded to allow the trial judge to consider an award of 
attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 809. The County contended that the State 
was responsible for attorneys’ fees; it therefore joined the State 
as a third-party defendant.  Id. at 807, 809.  The trial judge 
ruled that the State had to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees 
because the County “had been performing a state law 
enforcement function when it denied plaintiff access to the 
tape.”  Id. at 808.  The Appellate Division disagreed, holding 
“that as the custodian of the government record at issue here, 
the [County] is responsible under OPRA to pay plaintiff’s 
counsel fees.”  Id.  The Appellate Division relied for its 
conclusion on the text of OPRA, which repeatedly discusses 
the custodian’s obligation to allow or deny access to records.  
Id. at 810.  Because “it [was] undisputed that [the County] was 
the custodian of the 911 tape,” it was responsible for paying 
attorneys’ fees.  Id.  The Appellate Division “discern[ed] no 
legal basis to shift this financial burden to the State.”  Id. at 
811. 
Similarly, in K.L. v. Evesham Township Board of 
Education, the father of two elementary school children 
invoked OPRA in seeking school records about alleged 
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incidents of bullying.  32 A.3d 1136, 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2011).  The Board of Education refused to produce 
any records, asserting certain exemptions to protect the privacy 
of other students.  Id. at 1140–41.  After the father filed suit, 
the trial court ordered the Board to contact the parent of another 
child involved in an alleged bullying incident to seek 
permission to release the record.  Id. at 1141.  The other parent 
had no objection to the Board’s disclosure of the record, 
provided her child’s name was redacted.  Id.  The Board 
therefore released a redacted document that detailed the 
disciplining of another student for violent conduct against one 
of the father’s children.  Id.  Notwithstanding the father’s 
success in securing the release of the record, the trial court 
denied attorneys’ fees under OPRA.  Id. at 1142.  The 
Appellate Division reversed.  Id. at 1150.  It held that the father 
had proven that his lawsuit was the catalyst for disclosure of 
the document because “the Board declined to disclose the 
document until plaintiff filed his OPRA lawsuit and the court 
ordered in camera review.”  Id.  The father was thereby entitled 
to attorneys’ fees as a prevailing plaintiff.  Id. at 1151.  In that 
case, as here, it was not dispositive that a third party had a 
confidentiality interest in the disputed document.  See id. at 
1150–51. 
These authorities, taken together, lead us to one 
conclusion—it is of no moment that the FBI directed NJIT to 
withhold the disputed records.  NJIT, as the records custodian, 
bore the duty under OPRA to decide whether to release or 
withhold the records Golden and Locke sought, as well as the 
burden to pay attorneys’ fees if it made the wrong decision.  In 
making its decision, NJIT was free to consult with the FBI to 
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determine whether disclosure would impinge upon any of the 
FBI’s interests.  See, e.g., Gannett N.J. Partners, LP v. Cty. of 
Middlesex, 877 A.2d 330, 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(instructing records custodians who are not in a position to 
assess whether disclosure of a government record would 
impact the confidentiality interests of another agency to 
consult with “[t]he party with the interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of [the disputed records] and the capacity to 
explain the need for that confidentiality”).  NJIT did not err by 
advising the FBI that its interests may be affected by 
production of the documents or by seeking the FBI’s position 
as to whether disclosure would be proper.  Where NJIT went 
astray was in failing to exercise independent judgment and, 
instead, unquestioningly obeying the FBI’s orders to withhold 
the records.  NJIT is responsible for that choice and must bear 
the consequences, i.e., paying attorneys’ fees. 
C. 
In a final attempt to avoid liability, NJIT argues that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Mason imposed a requirement 
of reasonableness on parties in an OPRA dispute.  See Mason, 
951 A.2d at 1033.  According to NJIT, its own actions were 
eminently reasonable, thus immunizing it from any obligation 
to pay attorneys’ fees. 
NJIT’s proffered interpretation of Mason is 
unpersuasive.  There, the Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that OPRA includes a rebuttable 
presumption that attorneys’ fees are warranted whenever a 
defendant discloses a record post-lawsuit.  Id. at 1032–33.  The 
Court instead adopted the catalyst theory—that a requestor is 
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entitled to attorneys’ fees only if he can demonstrate “a factual 
causal nexus between [the] litigation and the relief ultimately 
achieved,” and “that the relief ultimately secured . . . had a 
basis in law.”  Id. at 1032.  The Supreme Court explained:  
“[t]rial courts would conduct that fact-sensitive inquiry on a 
case-by-case basis, evaluating the reasonableness of, and 
motivations for, an agency’s decisions, and viewing each 
matter on its merits.”  Id. at 1033. 
The Supreme Court’s reference to “reasonableness” in 
Mason is best read in light of its facts.  There, the agency had 
attempted to work with the requestor to produce records well 
before the requestor filed suit.  Id. at 1021–22.  In the midst of 
attempting to fulfill the plaintiff’s record request, the records 
custodian was also caring for his critically ill mother, who died 
the day before the requestor filed suit.  Id.  In assessing whether 
attorneys’ fees were warranted, the Supreme Court focused on 
the reasonableness of the agency’s efforts to produce records 
to the requestor:  the agency’s immediate response that certain 
records were temporarily unavailable, the illness and death of 
the records custodian’s mother, and the agency’s production of 
some records around the time the requestor filed suit.  Id. at 
1034.  “Because [the agency] had agreed to plaintiff’s request 
before she even filed suit, she cannot establish that her lawsuit 
entitles her to fees under the catalyst theory.”  Id. at 1034–35; 
see also Spectraserv, Inc., 7 A.3d at 239, 241–42 (ruling that 
the agency’s actions were reasonable—and that attorneys’ fees 
were thus unwarranted—due in part to the agency’s pre-suit 
attempts to accommodate the requestor’s demands).  We thus 
conclude that the “reasonableness” language in Mason refers 
to the reasonableness of an agency’s efforts to comply with a 
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document request before a lawsuit is filed—not whether the 
proffered basis for denying access is reasonable.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 47:1A-5(g) (explaining that the custodian must 
“attempt[] to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor” if 
a request for access “would substantially disrupt agency 
operations”). 
The plain language of the statute reinforces our 
conclusion.  OPRA’s attorneys’ fees provision does not include 
a reasonableness requirement, except as to the amount of any 
fee ultimately awarded.  Id. § 47:1A-6 (“A requestor who 
prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.” (emphasis added)).  By way of contrast, 
OPRA’s civil penalty provision does contain an 
“unreasonableness” requirement.  See id. § 47:1A-11(a) 
(providing for statutory penalties when a custodian “knowingly 
and willfully violates [OPRA] . . . and is found to have 
unreasonably denied access under the totality of the 
circumstances” (emphasis added)).  This contrasting language 
leads us to conclude that OPRA mandates attorneys’ fees in the 
mine run of cases but reserves civil penalties for unreasonable 
denials of access.  See Smith v. Hudson Cty. Register, 29 A.3d 
313, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (rejecting the 
agency’s argument that “it is inappropriate here to compel [it] 
to pay counsel fees because [it] had been behaving according 
to a reasonable interpretation” of OPRA, and, even though the 
agency had behaved reasonably, OPRA nonetheless mandated 
attorneys’ fees). 
Here, the District Court and the Magistrate Judge 
incorrectly concluded that, because NJIT had acted reasonably 
in following the FBI’s orders, it was absolved of any 
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responsibility to pay attorneys’ fees.  This interpretation of 
reasonableness misreads Mason and conflicts with the plain 
language of OPRA.  But even if Mason did impose the 
“reasonableness” requirement urged by NJIT, its conduct here 
was not reasonable.  As discussed supra, NJIT—not the FBI—
had the responsibility to parse the requested records, decide 
whether exemptions applied, and withhold documents 
pursuant to those exemptions.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-
5(g).  Instead, NJIT followed the FBI’s orders to withhold 
thousands of pages of records.  In doing so, it exposed itself to 
this litigation and the attorneys’ fees that accompany it.17 
IV. 
The District Court erred in concluding that Golden and 
Locke were not prevailing plaintiffs entitled to attorneys’ fees 
under OPRA.18  A factual causal nexus exists between Golden 
and Locke’s lawsuit and the release of records.  We will 
                                                 
17 The District Court’s Order could be read to suggest 
that Golden and Locke should have filed a FOIA request to 
obtain the disputed records directly from the FBI.  As NJIT 
readily admits, Golden and Locke had no obligation to proceed 
under FOIA.  We therefore reject any argument that Golden 
and Locke were required to seek from another agency the 
government records within OPRA’s purview. 
18 Golden also contends that the District Court erred by 
failing to review de novo the Magistrate Judge’s R&R.  
Because we are satisfied that the District Court conducted the 
required de novo review, we decline to reverse on this ground. 
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therefore reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand for 
the calculation of an appropriate fee award. 
 
 
